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THE CRUSHING OF A DREAM: DACA, DAPA AND THE POLITICS OF 
IMMIGRATION LAW UNDER PRESIDENT OBAMA 
Robert H. Wood* 
“The happy and the powerful do not go into exile, and there are no surer guarantees 
of equality among men than poverty and misfortune.”1 
―Alexis de Tocqueville 
 
In its most recent decision on immigration law, the Supreme Court of the United 
States deadlocked, 4–4, leaving in place a Fifth Circuit decision (decided 2–1),2 
which upheld the granting of a preliminary injunction against the Obama 
Administration implementing its most recent immigration law policy on deferred 
action against illegal immigrants.3 From the initial decision of the district court, 
through the Fifth Circuit, and in the Supreme Court, the decisions seemed flagrantly 
based on the political leanings of the judges or justices involved. The purpose of this 
article is to examine the issues in United States v. Texas, particularly the 
administrative law aspects of the case. 
Part I provides the factual and political background that provoked the litigation. 
Part II examines the grant of the preliminary injunction by the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas. Part III addresses the rulings by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Part IV describes the events that 
transpired at the Supreme Court. Part V examines a selected portion of the scholarly 
commentary generated by the case, and Part VI concludes that there is perhaps no 
other subject, other than abortion rights, that is so heavily impacted by the political 
perspectives of the jurists reviewing the challenges. As such, the judicial branch is 
probably not the most appropriate forum for the debates on these issues. They are 
best left to the political process. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Immigration restrictions have been the subject of U.S. law since the early days 
of the republic. When the 1790 Naturalization Act was passed, it limited 
naturalization to “free white person[s].”4 It was not until after the Civil War that this 
 ________________________  
 * Associate Professor of Legal Studies, University of Central Florida. 
 1. ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 12 (Henry Reeve trans., New York, Craighead & 
Allen 1838). 
 2. See United States v. Texas (Texas I), 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per curiam). 
 3. See Texas v. United States (Texas II), 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam, 136 S. Ct. 
2271 (2016). 
 4. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN IMMIGRATION WAVE BRINGS 59 MILLION TO U.S., DRIVING 
POPULATION GROWTH AND CHANGE THROUGH 2065: VIEWS OF IMMIGRATION’S IMPACT ON U.S. SOCIETY MIXED 
(2015) at 114 app. B tbl.3 (Immigration Law Timeline), http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2015/09/2015-09-
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ban was lifted for people of African descent.5 However, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion 
Act “banned Chinese laborers from immigrating for the next ten years,” a prohibition 
that was extended for another ten years in 1892.6 The ban on Asian immigrants was 
continued by the 1917 Immigration Act and the Emergency Quota Act of 1921.7 This 
was the first time the United States imposed a numerical quota for immigration based 
on nationality:8 only three percent of each foreign-born population of the United 
States was allowed to immigrate.9 There were no exclusions for countries based in 
the Western Hemisphere.10 These quotas were decreased to two percent of each 
foreign-born population in 1924.11 Further restrictions made the law favor Europeans 
from northern and western European countries, which had longer migration histories 
in the United States, as opposed to persons from eastern and southern European 
countries, which were relatively recent in their immigration history.12 Asians 
continued to be barred from immigration.13 
The ban on Asians was not removed until 1943, but they were still subject to 
limited quotas.14 In 1952, the national origins quotas were altered to be based on the 
immigrant populations of the census of 1920, which heavily favored immigrants 
from the United Kingdom, Germany, and Ireland.15 
It was not until 1965 that the national origins system was finally abolished; 
instead, a seven-category preference system that emphasized family reunification 
and skilled labor was adopted.16 Even so, immigrants from the Western Hemisphere 
were exempt from the preference system until 1976.17 Further, the law did not impose 
any visa cap on family members of U.S. citizens.18 
Throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, immigration law primarily dealt with 
the floods of refugees from South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, China, Nicaragua, and 
Haiti who were exempted from the immigration preference system under the 
Refugee Act of 1980.19 In 1986, President Reagan signed the Immigration Reform 
 ________________________  
28_modern-immigration-wave_REPORT.pdf. For a thorough discussion of immigration law history, see Hiroshi 
Motomura, The Foulston Siefkin Lecture: The President’s Dilemma: Executive Authority, Enforcement, and the Rule 
of Law in Immigration Law, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2015). 
 5. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 4, at 114 app. B tbl.3. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See id.  
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. 
 11. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 4, at 115 app. B tbl.3 (citing Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 153 
(1924) (repealed 1952)). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. (citing Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)). 
 16. See id. 
 17. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 4, at 115 app. B tbl.3 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 
Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965)). 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. at 115–16 app. B tbl.3 (citing Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990)). 
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and Control Act, which allowed unauthorized immigrant workers to gain a pathway 
to permanent residency.20 This affected 2.7 million residents.21 
However, by the mid-1990s, the focus changed to enforcement efforts against 
illegal immigration. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act was passed in 1996 to increase enforcement activities, build fences along the 
Mexican border, and deport criminal aliens.22 In 2006, the Secure Fence Act required 
the construction of a 700-mile double-layered fence as well.23 
Since that time, little immigration legislation has garnered bipartisan support, 
causing immigration reform advocates to despair and President Obama to take 
executive action in the face of stalled legislative efforts.  
In 2012, the President implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(“DACA”) policy, which allowed illegal immigrants who had been brought to the 
United States as children to obtain temporary deportation relief and obtain work 
permits.24 In 2014, the President implemented the Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) policy, which allowed 
illegal immigrants with U.S.-born children to apply for deportation relief and work 
permits.25 It was this last piece of executive action that was challenged in federal 
court.26 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT LITIGATION 
On February 16, 2015, United States District Court Judge Andrew S. Hanen 
granted a preliminary injunction sought by twenty-six states, including Texas, which 
filed an action for an injunction against the United States and the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) to prevent the implementation of DAPA.27 
The court noted that DAPA was instituted as the result of a memorandum from 
Secretary Jeh Johnson to DHS officials instructing them to implement a new policy 
expanding the application of deferred action status to certain categories of illegal 
immigrants, particularly people with “a son or daughter who was a U.S. citizen or 
permanent resident” and who had “resided in the United States since before . . . 
2010.”28 The memorandum also expanded the 2012 DACA policy to apply to a larger 
pool of applicants.29 Deferred action status is a practice where the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (“INS”) can use the power of prosecutorial discretion to 
 ________________________  
 20. Id. at 116 app. B tbl.3 (citing Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3445 
(1986)). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. (citing Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 
3009-546 (1996)). 
 23. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 4, at 117 app. B tbl.3 (citing Secure Fence Act, H.R. 6061, 109th Cong. 
(2006)). 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Texas v. United States (Texas IV), 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604, 677 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th 
Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 28. Id. at 610–11. 
 29. See id. The DACA policy was expanded to remove the age cap on eligible immigrants, extend the renewal 
and work authorization from two to three years, and adjust the date-of-entry requirement from 2007 to 2010. Id. 
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decline to deport an illegal immigrant for humanitarian reasons.30 It is not authorized 
by statute but has been utilized by many administrations going back to the 1960s.31 
Of the estimated “11.3 million illegal immigrants residing in the United States, [this 
program would] apply to approximately 4 million people.”32 In addition to the 
removal of the threat of deportation, deferred status also permits illegal immigrants 
work authorization so they can obtain employment legally.33 
The states contended that the DAPA program amounted to “a significant change 
in immigration law” unilaterally instituted by the executive branch in violation of 
the separation of powers doctrine and “the Take Care Clause of the Constitution.”34 
The issues before the court were as follows: (1) whether the states had 
constitutional standing to sue the federal government; (2) whether the DHS had the 
discretionary power to implement a program such as DAPA; and (3) “whether the 
DAPA program [was] constitutional, comport[ed] with existing laws, and was 
legally adopted.”35 
A. Standing 
The court concluded that Texas had standing under Article III on the grounds 
that the state would suffer a direct economic injury when DAPA beneficiaries 
applied for driver’s licenses.36 Applicants for a Texas license paid a fee of twenty-
four dollars, while the real cost to the state was $198.73.37 Based on the number of 
estimated DAPA beneficiaries residing in Texas, the total losses could exceed 
several million dollars.38 The court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Arizona 
Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer for the proposition that if Texas denied driver’s 
license applications from DAPA, the state was likely to face a successful Equal 
Protection Clause claim, as had Arizona in denying DACA beneficiaries’ driver’s 
licenses.39 This left Texas with no real choice in incurring the economic injury.40 
Additionally, the district court found that Texas had satisfied the requirements 
of prudential standing because it had not asserted a mere “generalized grievance,” 
and the claims were within the “zone of interests” protected by the immigration 
statutes.41 It was the duty of the federal government to protect Texas from economic 
 ________________________  
 30. See id. at 612–13. 
 31. See id. at 612 (citing Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 484 (1999)). 
 32. Texas IV, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 612. The figure is based on a 2009 study from the Pew Research Center. Id. 
at 678 n.11. 
 33. Id. at 611. 
 34. Id. at 613–14. The states argued that President Obama changed the law because Congress had not passed 
the DREAM Act. Id. 
 35. Id. at 607. 
 36. See Texas IV, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 623–24. 
 37. Id. at 617. 
 38. Id. The court also noted that federal law required states to determine the immigration status of applicants 
for state identification cards or licenses under the REAL ID Act of 2015. This cost the states approximately $.75 per 
applicant because they were required to use the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system as 
they were required to do under federal law. Id. 
 39. Id. at 620. 
 40. Id. at 618 (citing Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 41. Texas IV, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 624. 
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harm through enforcement of the immigration laws.42 The DAPA program, itself a 
violation of the immigration laws, placed Texas within the zone of interests at the 
very heart of the immigration laws.43 
Interestingly, the district court found that the states did not have the special 
standing to protect their sovereign interests under Massachusetts v. EPA because the 
indirect damages of having to provide additional health care, education, and law 
enforcement were not only speculative but not directly tied to DAPA.44 They were 
rather the result of lax enforcement policies in general.45 
The district court held that the plaintiff states had “abdication standing” because 
the government was refusing to enforce immigration laws.46 The court compared the 
case to Adams v. Richardson, where the 1964 D.C. Circuit found standing based on 
the refusal of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to enforce the Civil 
Rights Act by continuing to fund schools that were in non-compliance with racial 
integration laws.47  
Finally, the district court found that the plaintiffs met the standing requirements 
of the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) because DAPA was “a clear 
departure from the agency’s statutory authority” of immigration law enforcement.48 
Having found the requisite standing in favor of at least one of the plaintiffs, 
Texas, on several grounds, the district court proceeded to the merits of the states’ 
arguments.49 
B. Merits of the Claims 
The court opened its evaluation of the legality and constitutionality of DAPA 
with a discourse on prosecutorial discretion, noting that agency decisions to act or 
not to act were almost exclusively within the discretion of the executive branch.50 
However, the court noted that the states were not complaining of discretionary 
powers, but rather that the executive branch was itself legislating, and therefore 
intruding into the domain of Congress.51 
Following that preamble, the court addressed the first element of the test for 
issuance of a preliminary injunction: the likeliness of success on the merits.52  
Turning to the APA, the court noted that Section 702 allowed anyone suffering 
a legal wrong through agency action to obtain judicial review.53 However, courts are 
prevented from conducting such review when agency action is “committed to agency 
 ________________________  
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. Id. at 625. 
 45. Id. at 632 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)). 
 46. Id. at 643. 
 47. Texas IV, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 642 (citing Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1964)). 
 48. Id. at 643 (citing Manges v. Camp, 474 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
 49. Id. at 644. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 646. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Texas IV, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 647 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976)). 
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discretion by law.”54 The court recognized that the Supreme Court held in Heckler 
v. Chaney that non-enforcement decisions were presumptively unreviewable.55 
However, in this instance, DAPA was not inaction; it was affirmative action to award 
legal presence to people who were subject to deportation under immigration law.56 
Thus, the presumption of unreviewability imposed by Heckler was not applicable.57 
Yet, even if the presumption applied, it was sufficiently rebutted because “the 
substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its 
enforcement powers.”58 The immigration statutes had specific criteria for those 
subject to deportation, and DAPA recipients were clearly within the deportable 
categories.59 Despite that command, DAPA granted them lawful presence in the 
United States with the freedom of travel, work authorization, and Social Security 
benefits.60 The court found that the immigration laws did not provide the DHS with 
unlimited discretion to refuse to follow the law; instead, the DHS created its own 
law “from scratch” that was contradictory to the goals set by Congress.61 
Next, the court turned to the plaintiffs’ claim that the DAPA memorandum was 
actually an agency rule subject to the rulemaking requirements of the APA, which 
requires that a general notice be published in the Federal Register and that interested 
parties be able to participate and comment on the proposed rule.62 This is known as 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.63 An exception to the rulemaking requirement is 
for “general statements of policy.”64 Thus, the issue was whether the DAPA 
memorandum was a substantive rule requiring notice-and-comment procedures or a 
statement of policy, which was exempt.65 The court noted that substantive rules are 
those “that award rights, impose obligations, or have other significant effects on 
private interests . . . .”66 The judge characterized the government’s argument as 
“disingenuous,” listing the various times the DHS had called it a “program” and an 
“initiative.”67 Further, the court even referred to a White House press release in 
which President Obama called it a change in the law.68 
The court held that the DAPA memorandum created a binding set of specific 
eligibility requirements that “virtually extinguished” case officers’ discretion to deny 
DAPA status.69 Consequently, the memorandum was a substantive rule that should 
have gone through the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure rather than 
 ________________________  
 54. Id. at 652 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2011)). 
 55. Id. (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)). 
 56. Id. at 654. 
 57. Id. at 656. 
 58. Id. (citing Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832–33). 
 59. Texas IV, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 657. 
 60. Id. at 654. 
 61. Id. at 645, 663. 
 62. Id. at 664–65. 
 63. Id. at 665 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1966)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Texas IV, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 665 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1966)). 
 66. Id. at 666 (citing Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 595 n.19 (5th Cir. 
1995)). 
 67. Id. at 667. 
 68. Id. at 668. 
 69. Id. at 670. 
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in a general policy statement.70 The plaintiffs had therefore proven a reasonable 
likelihood of success on the merits.71 
The court also found the plaintiffs likely to suffer irreparable harm if the 
preliminary injunction were denied due to the millions of dollars in unrecoverable 
direct costs for providing driver’s licenses.72 “This genie will be impossible to put 
back in the bottle.”73 
Finally, “additional considerations suggest” that the government would not be 
overly burdened by being temporarily kept from implementing the policy.74 The 
court declined to address the constitutional claims at that time and awarded the 
preliminary injunction prohibiting the implementation of the DAPA program and the 
expansion of DACA pending trial on the merits.75 
III. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
A. Motion for Stay 
The first foray into the Fifth Circuit was the government’s motion for a stay of 
the preliminary injunction pending appeal.76 The panel of judges voted 2–1 to deny 
the motion for a stay.77 Judges Smith and Elrod held that the government was 
unlikely to succeed on the merits on appeal and left the injunction in place.78 
After reciting the facts of the case, the majority noted that the burden on the 
government was to show that the district court abused its discretion in entering its 
order.79 
The majority found that the district court did not err in its determination of 
standing because Texas was likely to meet its burden of proof that it would suffer a 
financial loss in the issuance of the additional driver’s licenses to DAPA 
beneficiaries.80 Although the government argued that DAPA did not require Texas 
either to issue licenses or to subsidize them, the court observed that Equal Protection 
Clause concerns could force Texas to issue the licenses anyway.81 Further, Texas 
would have to change its laws in order stop the subsidy.82 The court held that being 
pressured to change state law was itself an injury that conferred standing.83 
 ________________________  
 70. Id. at 671. 
 71. Texas IV, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 671–72. 
 72. Id. at 674. 
 73. Id. at 673. 
 74. Id. at 675. 
 75. Id. at 676–77. 
 76. See Texas v. United States (Texas III), 787 F.3d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 77. See id. at 743, 769. 
 78. Id. at 743. 
 79. Id. at 747 (citing Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1789 
(2014)). 
 80. Id. at 748 (first citing Texas IV, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 617; and then citing Cibolo Waste, Inc. v. City of San 
Antonio, 718 F.3d 469, 473–74 (5th Cir. 2013); Lion Health Servs., Inc. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 693, 699 (5th Cir. 
2011)). 
 81. See id. at 748–49. 
 82. Texas III, 787 F.3d at 749. 
 83. Id. 
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The government also argued that the cost of issuing driver’s licenses would be 
offset by economic benefits, such as increased tax revenue.84 The court gave short 
shrift to that approach, holding that the economic benefits do not arise from the same 
transaction, so they could not be considered.85 
Unlike the district court, the Fifth Circuit found standing under Massachusetts 
v. EPA, holding that Texas’s injury was “fairly traceable to the challenged action.”86 
The court held that, while not directly regulating Texas, DAPA would have a “direct 
and predictable effect” on its driver’s license program.87 The court held that Texas 
was entitled to the “special solicitude” the Supreme Court granted Massachusetts in 
that case.88 Further, since the injury alleged was easily “redressable by a favorable 
ruling,” Texas had satisfied the standing requirement and the government’s position 
was meritless.89 
Under the APA zone of interests test, the court was satisfied that the interests of 
the states were within the ambit of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, and that 
the test was “easily satisf[ied].”90 
Nor did the court believe that judicial review was precluded by statute or that the 
action was committed to agency discretion by law, the exceptions to APA 
reviewability.91 The court recognized that the decision not to deport an alien is an 
exercise of discretion that is unreviewable.92 However, DAPA was much more—a 
grant of lawful presence with accompanying benefits—and that turned it from an 
unreviewable discretionary action into a reviewable action.93 
The majority also upheld the district court’s finding that DAPA modified 
substantial rights and interests, triggering notice-and-comment rulemaking under the 
APA because it conferred lawful presence on 500,000 illegal aliens in Texas alone.94 
Thus, the government had not shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits.95 
Neither had the government demonstrated the possibility of irreparable injury, 
as opposed to the states that had shown a direct financial injury should DAPA be 
implemented.96 Finally, the court rejected the assertion that the nationwide scope of 
 ________________________  
 84. Id. at 750. 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id. at 751 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013)). 
 87. Id. at 752. 
 88. Texas III, 787 F.3d at 752. 
 89. Id. at 753 (quoting Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147). 
 90. Id. at 754. 
 91. Id. at 755 (first quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2011); then quoting 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) (2005); and then citing 
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B, 467 U.S. 883, 897 (1984); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)). 
 92. Id. at 756 (citing Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012)). 
 93. Id. at 758 (first quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S. Ct. 936, 947 (1999); 
then quoting Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Servs., et al., at 2 (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf.; and then quoting Heckler 
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)). 
 94. Texas III, 787 F.3d at 766 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1153 (5th 
Cir. 1984); Brown Exp., Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 701–03 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
 95. Id. at 767. 
 96. Id. at 767–68 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 
406, 410 (5th Cir. 2015)). 
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the injunction was an abuse of discretion.97 The government argued that it should be 
limited to Texas or the plaintiff states.98 However, the court decided that uniformity 
in the application of immigration law was preferred.99 
The dissent, written by Judge Stephen A. Higginson, would have held that Fifth 
Circuit and Supreme Court precedent foreclosed review of the states’ complaint.100 
In a prior immigration case, Texas v. United States, the Fifth Circuit held that the 
argument that the government had failed to enforce immigration law and failed to 
pay for the states’ costs was not a reviewable matter under the APA.101 Nor was lack 
of immigration enforcement an abdication of duties reviewable by a court.102 Further, 
in Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that prosecutorial 
discretion was unreviewable.103 
The judge criticized the lower court’s opinion on the basis that it confused the 
distinction between “lawful status” and “lawful presence.”104 Lawful status is a right 
conferred by statute to stay in the United States, while lawful presence is a temporary 
classification given over to the discretion of the DHS and does not change the 
permanent status of the immigrant.105 
Judge Higginson believed that the case was nonjusticiable, with immigration law 
and policy given over to the political branches of government.106 
B. On Appeal 
On the panel hearing the full appeal, Judge Higginson was replaced by Judge 
King, who also dissented in response to the majority opinion written by Judge Smith 
and joined in by Judge Elrod, the two judges who formed the majority on the motions 
panel.107 In its forty-three-page opinion, the majority denied the appeal, finding that 
the states had properly asserted standing, had demonstrated the likelihood of success 
on the merits on the APA claims, and had otherwise met the requirements for an 
injunction.108 
The court reiterated its prior finding that the states were entitled to the “special 
solicitude” standing of Massachusetts v. EPA, and therefore did not address other 
bases for standing.109 The majority noted that in Massachusetts v. EPA, the 
 ________________________  
 97. See id. at 768–69 (first quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; then quoting Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 115(1), 100 Stat. 3359, 3384; and then quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 
2502). 
 98. See id. at 769. 
 99. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). 
 100. Texas III, 787 F.3d at 769–70. 
 101. Id. at 770 (quoting Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 771 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)). 
 104. Id. at 774. 
 105. Id. at 774–75 (first quoting Dhuka v. Holder, 716 F.3d 149, 156 (5th Cir. 2013); then quoting 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) (2013); and then citing Chaudhry v. Holder, 705 F.3d 289, 292 (7th Cir. 2013)). 
 106. Texas III, 787 F.3d at 776, 784 (first citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2011); Perales v. Casillas, 903 F.2d 1043, 
1045–47 (5th Cir. 1990); and then citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)). 
 107. Texas v. United States (Texas II), 809 F.3d 134, 146, 188 (5th Cir. 2015); Texas III, 787 F.3d at 743. 
 108. Texas II, 809 F.3d at 146. 
 109. Id. at 154–55. 
9
: The Crushing of a Dream
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2017
36 Barry Law Review Vol. 22, No. 1 
 
procedural right to challenge EPA decisions was in the text of the Clean Air Act and 
provided the Court with the justification to find standing by the states.110 The court 
noted that the procedural statute relied on in the present case was more attenuated 
because the APA did not specifically apply to immigration law.111 However, the 
majority believed that because the DHS had taken affirmative action to bestow rights 
on illegal aliens, rather than the EPA’s decision not to regulate, no similar procedural 
right was even necessary to support state standing.112 The court again held that Texas 
had satisfied the standing requirement due to the cost of issuing driver’s licenses,113 
that such injury was fairly traceable to DAPA,114 and that the matter was redressable 
through an injunction.115 
The majority again denied the government’s claim that Section 701(a)(2) of the 
APA exempted such challenges from judicial review because deferral decisions were 
committed to agency discretion by law.116 The court characterized DAPA as an 
affirmative decision to grant lawful presence with accompanying benefits, rather 
than a decision to refrain from prosecuting a deportation proceeding.117 
Despite the discretionary language in the DAPA memorandum, the court was 
still not convinced it should be categorized as a policy statement, thereby exempt 
from the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.118 Like the district 
court, the appellate panel viewed the Agency’s characterization with great suspicion, 
finding the statements regarding discretion to be “merely pretext” because so few 
applications for the previous program, DACA, had been denied.119 
The court also found that DAPA did not qualify as a rule “of agency 
organization, procedure or practice” exempt from rulemaking procedures under 
Section 553(b)(A) of the APA.120 The court applied the “substantial impact test” to 
determine that DAPA was not merely procedural in nature because it conferred 
lawful presence on a half-million residents of Texas, which would then have to spend 
millions on driver’s licenses or undergo a change in the law.121 
Remarkably, despite the fact that the district court had not ruled on the 
substantive APA claims,122 the Fifth Circuit addressed them in its opinion, citing its 
 ________________________  
 110. Id. at 151 (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007)). 
 111. Id. at 152 (first quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2011); and then citing New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau 
of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 694, 696 n.13 (10th Cir. 2009); Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 
1236, 1241–42 (10th Cir. 2008)). 
 112. Id. (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985); 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1966)). 
 113. Id. at 149. 
 114. Texas II, 809 F.3d at 156. 
 115. Id. at 161. 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. at 148–49. 
 118. Id. at 177. 
 119. Id. at 172; Texas v. United States (Texas IV), 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 613 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 
(5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 120. Texas II, 809 F.3d at 176–77. 
 121. Id. at 176. 
 122. See Texas IV, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 677. 
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authority to “affirm the district court’s judgment on any grounds supported by the 
record.”123 The court noted that the APA provided that the  
reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action 
. . . found to be—(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with the law . . . [or] (C) in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
right.124  
Further, under the Chevron Doctrine, a court reviewing an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute must first ask whether Congress already “addressed the 
precise question at issue.”125 The court stated that Congress had already addressed 
the issue of what classes of immigrants could be “lawfully present” in the country, 
including those eligible for deferred action status.126 Those classes did not include 
the 4.3 million illegal immigrants under DAPA, according to the court, who further 
analyzed immigration law to show that DAPA expanded on existing classifications 
of immigration law.127 The court reasoned that if Congress had wanted to vastly 
increase the class of persons subject to deferred action, it would have done so 
expressly.128 Even if Congress had not spoken directly to the issue, the court would 
strike down DAPA as “manifestly contrary” to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Act.129 Finding no other error with the district court’s order, the Fifth Circuit affirmed 
the granting of the preliminary injunction.130 
Judge King responded to the majority opinion with a scathing fifty-three page 
dissent in which she characterized the grant of the preliminary injunction as “a 
mistake,”131 “clearly erroneous,”132 “wrong,”133 “dangerous precedent,”134 
“reversible error,”135 without “precedent,”136 “an abuse of discretion,”137 and a 
“litany of errors.”138 Similarly, the majority opinion was a “mistake”139 and 
“misleading.”140 
 ________________________  
 123. Texas II, 809 F.3d at 178 (citing Palmer ex rel. Palmer v. Waxahachie Indep. Sch. Dist., 579 F.3d 502, 
506 (5th Cir. 2009)). 
 124. Id. at 178 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1966)). 
 125. Id. at 179 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
 126. See id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. at 181 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015)). 
 129. See Texas II, 809 F.3d at 181–82. 
 130. Id. at 186, 188. 
 131. Id. at 189. 
 132. Id. at 190. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 201. 
 135. Texas II, 809 F.3d at 207. 
 136. Id. at 208. 
 137. Id. at 213. 
 138. Id. at 214. 
 139. Id. at 217, 219. 
 140. Id. at 217. 
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The first point the dissent made related to the issue of prosecutorial discretion.141 
She noted that of the 11.3 million aliens subject to removal, Congress only provided 
the DHS with financial resources to deport approximately 400,000 per year.142 
Congress has generally left it up to the Secretary of the DHS “to [e]stablish national 
immigration enforcement policies and priorities.”143 With limited funds to work 
with, the DHS followed the command of Congress to focus on removing aliens 
convicted of crimes.144 Both DACA and DAPA represent a decision by the Secretary 
to place a category of deportable aliens on a lower priority status, a classic expression 
of prosecutorial discretion.145  
As for standing, Judge King believed the majority misconstrued Massachusetts 
v. EPA by taking a single, isolated phrase from the case, “special solicitude,” and 
converting it into an unlimited expansion of state standing.146 She noted that standing 
was found in that case because of a provision of the Clean Air Act that gave standing 
to challenge the EPA’s rulemaking decisions.147 Neither the INA nor the APA gave 
such standing to the states.148 She considered this decision to be a “breathtaking 
expansion of state standing” with “no principled limit.”149 She also dismissed the 
assertion that an incidental increase in driver’s license fees was sufficient to 
constitute an injury-in-fact for standing purposes because Texas had voluntarily 
decided to underwrite the cost of all driver’s licenses and had voluntarily allowed 
immigrants with deferred action status to apply for them.150 Any “pressure to change 
state law” had been manufactured by the litigants for this case.151 
The dissent agreed with the analysis of the prior dissenter, Judge Higginson, 
concluding that the matter was simply nonjusticiable because the DAPA 
memorandum was simply a matter of enforcement discretion unreviewable under the 
APA.152 The DAPA memorandum did not itself confer any rights or benefits.153 For 
example, the work authorization was provided by a separate regulation that had been 
in force since the 1980s, which had been promulgated using notice-and-comment 
rulemaking under the APA.154 Further, the majority’s conclusion that “lawful 
presence” constituted a benefit was misplaced.155 She pointed out that “lawful status” 
created a protected legal right, while “lawful presence” was merely the “exercise of 
discretion by a public official.”156 She observed that the proper resolution of the case 
 ________________________  
 141. Texas II, 809 F.3d at 188. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 190 (citing 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2016) (internal quotes omitted)). 
 144. Id. (citing Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 114-4, 129 Stat. 39, 43 (2015)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 193, 195. 
 147. Texas II, 809 F.3d at 193 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007)). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 194–95 (quoting a 1993 law review article written by Chief Justice Roberts, Article III Limits on 
Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219 (1993)). 
 150. Id. at 195. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 196. 
 153. See Texas II, 809 F.3d at 196. 
 154. See id. at 197–98 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2016)). 
 155. Id. at 199. 
 156. Id. (citing Dhuka v. Holder, 716 F.3d 149, 156 (5th Cir. 2013)). 
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was through the political process because it was simply a dispute over immigration 
policy.157 She noted, as had Judge Higginson, that the dozens of amicus briefs filed 
by politicians and law enforcement officials reflected the political nature of the 
dispute, and even the district court opinion reflected dissatisfaction with the 
immigration system.158 This, despite the fact that there had been a record number of 
deportations under the Obama Administration.159 
The dissent next addressed the procedural claim under the APA, suggesting that 
the starting point in the analysis was the memorandum creating DAPA itself, which 
stated ten times that determinations of deferred action status were to be made on a 
case-by-case basis.160 The amount of discretion given to the case officers reflected 
its status as a statement of policy rather than a substantive rule subject to notice-and-
comment procedures.161 The district court also committed reversible error in its 
factual conclusion that the discretionary language in the DAPA memorandum was 
merely “pretext” because DAPA had yet to be implemented, so there was no factual 
support for that conclusion.162 The dissent also found it unprecedented that the 
district court would rely on the President’s press releases and the DAPA website to 
support its conclusions that DAPA was a substantive rule.163 
Judge King also found that there were sufficient conflicts in the evidence, as 
reflected in the affidavits, and that the district court had abused its discretion in 
failing to hold an evidentiary hearing.164 
The dissent also voiced an objection to the majority’s address of the substantive 
APA claim when the district court had not based its decision on that issue, nor had 
the issue been adequately briefed on the appellate level.165 
The dissent noted that the majority had misapplied the Chevron test, which 
requires courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if it is reasonable.166 
The majority erred in finding that Congress had already addressed the issue of 
deferred action by creating “lawful immigration classifications,” including some 
grants of deferred action.167 However, Congress had not “directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue” in DAPA, so step one of the Chevron test was not 
satisfied.168 The majority also erred in finding DAPA unreasonable under step two 
of the Chevron test because it did not conflict with any provision in the INA.169 
Therefore, DAPA was not a substantive violation of the APA.170 
The dissent forcefully concluded that “a mistake has been made.”171 
 ________________________  
 157. Id. at 201. 
 158. Id. at 201–02. 
 159. Texas II, 809 F.3d at 202. 
 160. Id. at 203. 
 161. See id. at 203–04. 
 162. Id. at 207. 
 163. Id. at 208. 
 164. Id. at 212–13. 
 165. Texas II, 809 F.3d at 214–15. 
 166. Id. at 215. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 216 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837 (1984)).  
 169. Id. at 218. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Texas II, 809 F.3d at 219. 
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT 
The United States filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on November 20, 2015, 
presenting three questions for review: 
1. Whether a State that voluntarily provides a subsidy to all aliens 
with deferred action has Article III standing and a justiciable cause 
of action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 
500, et seq., to challenge the Guidance because it will lead to more 
aliens having deferred action[;] 
2. Whether the Guidance is arbitrary and capricious or otherwise 
not in accordance with the law[; and] 
3. Whether the Guidance was subject to the APA’s notice-and-
comment procedures.172 
The petition was granted on January 19, 2016, with the following order: “[T]he 
parties are directed to brief and argue the following question: Whether the Guidance 
violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 3.”173 
Justice Scalia passed away on February 12, 2016, leaving the Court with eight 
members.174 After hearing oral arguments and receiving numerous amicus briefs, the 
Court issued a per curiam decision on June 23, 2016, which stated: “The judgment 
is affirmed by an equally divided Court.”175 
On July 18, 2016, the United States took the unusual step of filing a Petition for 
Rehearing, citing instances in which the Court had granted rehearings following the 
death or vacancy of a Justice, such as Justice Cardozo’s death in 1938.176 The Petition 
for Rehearing was distributed for Conference on September 26, 2016.177 The Petition 
was denied.178 
 ________________________  
 172. Texas II, 809 F.3d 134, petition for cert. filed, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/us-v-texas-petition.pdf. 
 173. Texas II, 809 F.3d 134, cert. granted, United States v. Texas (No. 15-674), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/011916zor_l5gm.pdf.  
 174. See Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html. 
 175. United States v. Texas (Texas I), 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam). 
 176. Petition for Rehearing at 2–3, Texas I, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/15-674-Petition-for-Rehearing.pdf. 
 177. Proceedings and Orders at 4, Texas I, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/15-674.htm. 
 178. United States v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 285 (2016). 
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V. THE SCHOLARLY DEBATE 
While the matter was pending before the Supreme Court, fifty-one amicus briefs 
were filed with the Court.179 However, two briefs merit particular attention, both in 
support of the petitioners.  
Professor Walter Dellinger “is the Douglas B. Maggs Professor Emeritus of Law 
at Duke University” and a noted scholar in administrative law.180 Professor Dellinger 
noted at the outset that immigration issues were at the forefront of the current 
presidential election campaign as “one of the most divisive, ideologically charged 
questions of our day.”181 He thought there was only one answer to the question of 
whether the case should be heard by the federal judiciary, and that was a resounding 
“no.”182 Rather, the resolution had to be left to the political process.183 He also 
worried that the precedential value of the case would open the door to future state 
challenges to federal action that had no place within the court system.184 Further, the 
“novel theory of APA review would likewise place the courts in a supervisory status 
over a wide range of discretionary executive decisions, without any meaningful 
standards for evaluating them.”185 
The second submission worth noting was the Brief of Administrative Law 
Scholars as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, filed by twelve administrative 
law scholars at the finest law schools in America, including Harvard, Yale, 
Michigan, and Columbia.186 They noted that the DAPA memorandum merely 
represented “the formalization of the DHS’s policy with respect to the agency’s 
exercise of statutory enforcement discretion” that did not create legal rights or 
obligations.187 As a general policy statement, it was exempt from notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures under Section 553 of the APA.188 They noted 
several errors on the part of the Fifth Circuit, including the mistaken assumption that 
the DAPA memorandum was rulemaking because it did not leave employees free to 
exercise discretion in administering the policy.189 In fact, the very purpose of a policy 
statement is to bind lower level agency officials so the agency policies are 
 ________________________  
 179. Proceedings and Orders at 4, Texas I, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/15-674.htm. 
 180. Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Texas I, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 
15-674), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/15-674-tsac-Dellinger.pdf. 
 181. Id. at 3. 
 182. Id. at 4. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.  
 186. Brief for Administrative Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Texas I, 136 S. Ct. 2271 
(2016) (No. 15-674), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/15-674tsacAdminLawScholars.pdf. 
(Amici included: Daniel A. Farber, U.C. Berkley; Michael Herz, Cardozo School of Law; Ronald M. Levin, 
Washington University School of Law; Jerry L. Mashaw, Yale Law School; Nina A. Mendelson, University of 
Michigan Law School; Gillian E. Metzger, Columbia Law School; Anne O’Connell, U.C. Berkley School of Law; 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., George Washington Law School; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Yale Law School, Kevin M. Stack, 
Vanderbilt Law School, Peter L. Strauss, Yale Law School; and Adrian Vermeule, Harvard Law School). 
 187. Id. at 3. 
 188. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1966)). 
 189. Id. at 3–4. 
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followed.190 To require notice-and-comment rulemaking every time an agency head 
provides guidance to employees would impair the ability of agencies to function 
effectively.191 
The Fifth Circuit further erred in applying the “substantial impact test” as a basis 
for requiring notice-and-comment rulemaking.192 Nothing in the APA can be read to 
require such a test, which would effectively nullify the existing APA exemptions to 
rulemaking.193 Policy statements naturally have “practical effects” on the public, 
without creating legal rights and obligations that are the basis for requiring 
rulemaking procedures.194 
Neither does the ability of deferred action designees to seek work authorization 
convert the DAPA memorandum into a substantive rule.195 That right was the result 
of a 1987 regulation that did go through the rulemaking procedures.196 The 
academics further warned that the Fifth Circuit was improperly adding procedural 
layers to the APA.197 
Not all administrative law scholars support the government’s position. In an 
interesting symposium held online at the SCOTUSblog.com website, many different 
views have been exchanged.198 
For example, John Eastman of Chapman University School of Law observed that 
three constitutional issues raised by the DAPA policy were troubling.199 First, the 
INS statute employs the word “shall” to mandate removal of all illegal aliens from 
the United States.200 That removes the discretion of the INS to implement deferred 
action.201 Second, that there is a significant difference between the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion in individual cases and the “impermissible wholesale 
suspension of the law.”202 Third, the President’s decision is more than one not to 
prosecute, but the granting of lawful presence with associated benefits such as work 
authorization.203 However, the INA prohibits the employment of “unauthorized 
aliens” who are defined as those who are not “lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence.”204 Thus, the Administration is actually violating the INA with the DAPA 
program.205 
 ________________________  
 190. Id. at 4. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Brief for Administrative Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 186, at 4. 
 193. Id. at 5 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1966)). 
 194. Id. at 4–5. 
 195. Id. at 5. 
 196. Id. (citing Control of Employment of Aliens, 8 C.F.R. § 274a (2016)).  
 197. Id. (citing Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015)). 
 198. See United States v. Texas, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/united-states-v-
texas/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
 199. John Eastman, Symposium: Barack Obama Is Not King, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 11, 2016, 1:19 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/symposium-barack-obama-is-not-king/. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Eastman, supra note 199. 
16
Barry Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 2
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol22/iss1/2
Fall 2016 The Crushing of a Dream 43 
 
Jay Sekulow, Chief Counsel for the American Center for Law and Justice, argues 
that President Obama “was correct when he said he ‘changed the law.’”206 However, 
it was an unconstitutional, unilateral action that violated the Take Care Clause.207 
Sekulow describes DAPA as “an extra-legislative reincarnation of the DREAM Act, 
which Congress has repeatedly refused to enact.”208 
Richard Samp, Chief Counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation, supports the 
assertion that DAPA creates a substantive rule under the APA because it instructs 
subordinates how to carry out immigration law with regard to a specific set of 
unauthorized aliens.209 A general policy statement, on the other hand, merely informs 
the public of how the agency intends to enforce the law in the future.210 
Dan Stein, President of the Federation of American Immigration Reform, 
believes that the Obama Administration has shirked its duty to enforce immigration 
laws, and by substituting its own policies in their place, has rendered meaningless 
the powers vested in Congress by the Constitution.211 
Jonathan Adler, of Case Western Reserve University School of Law, probably 
best summed it up when he commented that “legal and political commentators 
tended to split along ideological lines. Progressives generally supported the 
president’s authority to take broad unilateral actions; conservatives generally 
opposed.”212 This leads us to the premise of this article, which is the political nature 
of the immigration debate. 
VI. THE POLITICS 
One aspect of this case that has received little attention is the political alignment 
of the judges who have been involved in the proceedings. A closer look demonstrates 
that the judges have split along the familiar conservative/progressive divide. For 
example, Judge Hanen was appointed to the federal bench by President George H.W. 
Bush in 1992, but his nomination lapsed when President Clinton took office.213 He 
was again nominated by President George W. Bush in 2002 and assumed duties as a 
federal district judge for the Southern District of Texas with chambers in 
 ________________________  
 206. Jay Sekulow, Symposium: Constitutional Limits of Presidential Power—Changing the Law or Enforcing 
It, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 8, 2016, 10:09 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/symposium-constitutional-limits-
of-presidential-power-changing-the-law-or-enforcing-it/.   
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See Richard Samp, Symposium: The Government’s Violation of the APA’s Notice-and-Comment 
Requirements Provides a Simple Solution to a Thorny Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 10, 2016, 11:04 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/symposium-the-governments-violation-of-the-apas-notice-and-comment-
requirements-provides-a-simple-solution-to-a-thorny-case/. 
 210. See id. 
 211. Dan Stein, Symposium: Why United States v. Texas Is the Most Important Case the Court Will Decide 
this Year, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 9, 2016, 9:55 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/symposium-why-united-
states-v-texas-is-the-most-important-case-the-court-will-decide-this-year/. 
 212. Jonathan Adler, Symposium: Tripped Up by a Tie Vote, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 7:41 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-tripped-up-by-a-tie-vote/. 
 213. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, Hanen, Andrew S., FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2931&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
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Brownsville, Texas.214 A reading of his opinion in Texas v. United States shows a 
very strong bias against Obama immigration officials, as noted in an excellent article 
by Anil Khan of Drexel University Law School.215 He writes: “Drawing more from 
the political discourse surrounding the deferred action initiatives than from sound 
legal principles, the ruling highlights an erosion of the conventional lines between 
litigation, adjudication, and public discourse in politically salient cases . . . .”216 Khan 
notes that Judge Hanen attacked the Obama Administration’s immigration policies 
and officials in other cases as well, so that by 2014 he had “excoriated the Obama 
administration’s policymaking officials for the manner in which they established 
enforcement priorities, issued administrative guidance, implemented policies, and 
exercised prosecutorial discretion.”217 Judge Hanen’s open hostility to the 
Administration was again on display in the current case when, believing that 
Department of Justice attorneys had lied to him about the number of DAPA 
beneficiaries who had already been processed, he ordered the entire Justice 
Department staff of as many as 3000 Justice Department attorneys, within twenty-
six states, to complete mandatory ethics training.218 He later stayed his own order.219 
This is hardly the nonpartisan hearing expected in a federal court. 
On the appellate level, the judges of the Fifth Circuit were polite to each other 
on the surface before plunging in the knives.220 However, the judges also split along 
ideological lines. The author of the motions panel opinion and the full appeal was 
Judge Jerry Smith, a Reagan appointee in 1987,221 while the other judge in the 
majority, Judge Jennifer Elrod was a G.W. Bush appointee in 2007.222 The dissenter 
in the motions panel decision was Judge Stephen A. Higginson, appointed by 
President Obama in 2011,223 and the dissenter on the full appeal was Judge Carolyn 
King, appointed by President Carter in 1979.224 
As for the Supreme Court, the per curiam decision did not reveal how the 
Justices voted, only that there was a 4-4 split.225 One can assume that was also 
 ________________________  
 214. Id. 
 215. Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of Law Basis for 
Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 58 (2015). 
 216. Id. at 64. 
 217. Id. at 81. 
 218. Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Who Required Ethics Training for Possibly 3,000 DOJ Lawyers Stays His 
Order, ABA J. (June 8, 2016), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge_who_required_ethics_training_for_possibly_3000_doj_lawyers_st
ays_his. 
 219. Id. 
 220. “Our dedicated colleague has penned a careful dissent, with which we largely but respectfully disagree. 
It is well-researched, however, and bears a careful read.” Texas v. United States (Texas II), 809 F.3d 134, 146 n.5 
(5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 221. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, Smith, Jerry Edwin, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2219&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
 222. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, Elrod, Jennifer Walker, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=3159&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
 223. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, Higginson, Stephen Andrew, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=3400&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
 224. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, King, Carolyn Dineen, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1963&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
 225. See United States v. Texas (Texas I), 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per curiam). 
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reflective of the standard liberal/conservative divide that has plagued the Court in 
recent years. 
The irony is that when a Republican President is in power, the abuse of the 
executive discretionary power is bemoaned by Democrats and when a Democrat is 
in power, the reverse is true. We now have President Trump, who would use his 
executive discretion to deport as many undocumented aliens as humanly possible. 
Judges Higginson and King probably had the better argument that the case was 
nonjusticiable due to the political nature of the dispute. In the meantime, the split 
vote by the Supreme Court means that the preliminary injunction will stay in place 
until there is a full trial on the merits in Texas before a judge who has already 
indicated his disdain for the government’s policies and legal positions, crushing the 
dreams of citizenship for millions of undocumented aliens and sending them back 
into the shadows of illegal status. 
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